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People First:  The Cuban Travel Ban, Wet Foot-Dry 
Foot and Why the Executive Branch Can and Should 
Begin Normalizing Cuba Policy 
JARRETT BARRIOS† 
I. INTRODUCTION:  THE ILLOGIC OF CUBAN EXCEPTIONALISM IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
“Still?”  The question hung in the air between us like a cloud of stale 
smoke.   
My friend stared at me in disbelief.  I knew what was coming next:  a 
battery of ‘“whys”. Why has the United States, the “home of the free,” 
restricted its citizens from travelling to Cuba? Why do Cuban-Americans 
support this—especially if it’s their Cuban family who suffer most from 
this restriction?1 Why do we exempt Cuban exiles from the immigration 
                                                                                                                          
†Jarrett Barrios is the CEO of the American Red Cross of Eastern Massachusetts.  In 1999, he 
founded ACCESO, a humanitarian organization providing direct aid to Cubans and has led almost two 
dozen humanitarian delegations to Cuba. I am grateful to Professor Kaaryn Gustafson of the University 
of Connecticut Law School and Dean Anthony E. Varona of the American University Washington 
College of Law for their thoughtful reviews of drafts of this article, along with Sarah Stephens, 
Executive Director of Center for Democracy in the Americas.  In addition, I am grateful to Department 
of Treasury officials for interpretive guidance regarding new administrative regulations with regard to 
Cuba travel.  Finally, special thanks to Thomas Ziehnert and Caitlin Fahey of the Connecticut Public 
Interest Law Journal for their thoughtful editing of this piece. 
1 While public opinion among Cuban-Americans has shifted in recent years, the public perception 
persists that they are the primary opponents of normalizing travel policy. See generally Cuban 
American Opinions Concerning U.S. Policy Toward Cuba and the U.S. Election, INST. FOR PUB. 
OPINION RES., FLA. INT’L U. (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www2.fiu.edu/~ipor/cuba-t/ (follow “Brookings 
summary of FIU Cuba Transition Poll results [PDF]” hyperlink). David Adams, In Tough Economic 
Times, Public Opinion Shifts on Cuba Embargo,” ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/world/in-tough-economic-times-public-opinion-shifts-on-cuba-
embargo/1035898 (citing support by Cuban Americans despite surveys to contrary).  Social science 
research supports the conclusion that Cubans on the island suffered consequences from the travel ban 
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laws which apply to everyone else in the world?  And most amazing of all, 
why after fifty years of these failed policies, does the Obama 
administration still support them? 
The history of the travel ban reads like a spy thriller. With their origins 
mired in cloak-and-dagger Cold War politics, these travel restrictions have 
evolved substantially since the fall of Communism, but still prohibit 
United States citizens from freely travelling to Cuba.  At least as 
remarkable is U.S. immigration policy towards Cuban nationals, which 
includes a special visa lottery for Cubans, an additional, special 
humanitarian parole policy used almost exclusively for Cubans, and most 
unusual of all, the Wet Foot-Dry Foot policy that lets any Cuban setting 
foot on U.S. land adjust status to become a permanent resident―regardless 
of the legality of their entry.   
These two people policies have been central in U.S. efforts to end the 
Castro regime—a goal advanced zealously by the powerful U.S.-based 
Cuban exile community for over 50 years2―though neither policy has ever 
been fully codified at law. Instead, interest group politics and judicial 
deference to administrative policies have defended and perpetuated a 
confusing web of executive branch regulations that are neither logical nor 
typical of United States foreign policy.3 Equally remarkable is that both 
policies have failed entirely to achieve their goals of reforming Cuban 
politics and society. 
Despite fifty years of failure, the “people policies” of the embargo 
have been largely maintained by the current administration.  The troubling 
travel prohibitions have been modified ever so slightly and an 
exceptionalist immigration policy remains firmly in place.4  If the goal of 
the “regime change” of the last fifty years remains the same, or more 
modestly, if it is to hasten such change and prepare Cuban civil society for 
transitioning to a democratic state when domestic circumstances in Cuba 
                                                                                                                          
and restrictions on “family remittances.”  See Deborah Weissman, The Legal Production of the 
Transgressive Family:  Binational Family Relationships between Cuba and the United States, 88 N.C. 
L. REV. 1881, 1907–08 (2010) (arguing binational families suffer concrete harms from the ban, such as 
nutritional deficits and lack of medicine). 
2 See generally PATRICK J. HANEY & WALT VANDERBUSH, THE CUBAN EMBARGO: DOMESTIC 
POLITICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, vii, 1–2 (2005) (providing historical background to U.S. 
policies towards Cuba); DAVID RIEFF, THE EXILE: CUBA IN THE HEART OF MIAMI 14–15 (1993) 
(illustrating “the Dialogue” in the Cuban community during the 1970’s). 
3 Ted Henken, Balseros, Boteros, and El Bombo: Post-1994 Cuban Immigration to the United 
States and the Persistence of Special Treatment, 3 LATINO STUDIES 393, 394–96 (2005). 
4  See Statement: Reaching out to the Cuban People, OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SEC’Y 
(Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/14/reaching-out-cuban-people 
(explaining how the Obama Administration has opened up family travel and widened the religious 
educational and journalist categories, but hasn’t gone nearly as far as its discretion permits to override 
the ban).   
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allow for such change,5 there are surely alternatives which promise greater 
success. 
These policies have not only failed in their stated objectives, but are 
also unfair.  Fairness—the principle of treating all human beings with 
equal concern and respect6—has deep roots in the Anglo-American legal 
tradition.7  Modern Anglo-American jurisprudence has widely applied 
principles of fairness to conceptions of justice and decision-making; this 
concept of fairness animates, too, policy pronouncements and justifications 
of governments like the United States which are built on this legal 
tradition. 8  
Applied in the instant case of Cuba policy, the travel ban is 
extraordinarily retributive towards Cuba as well as towards Americans 
seeking to travel to the island.  This policy rule dramatically singles out 
Cuba as the only nation against which travel is banned in this fashion—and 
by association, unfairly circumscribes US citizens’ right to travel in order 
to support its failed foreign policy goal.  Similarly, a fairness analysis of 
U.S. immigration policy towards Cuban nationals points to a different 
brand of unfairness. The Cuban Adjustment Act (“CAA”) permits any 
Cuban touching ground in the United States to naturalize immediately, 
effectively circumventing the elaborate system of quotas and visa 
application procedures applicable for nationals from every other country in 
the world.  Targeting Cubans for extraordinarily generous treatment is 
unfair to others, and cannot be justified as sound policy.   
Whether it is because they have failed or because they are unfair, the 
illogic of Cuban exceptionalism has yet to dissuade the current 
administration from applying these “people policies.”  Persisting into the 
present, the first and second sections of this article review the origins of 
these “people policies,” including the jurisprudence that developed to 
protect their application, to better understand their tenacious rootedness in 
today’s policy landscape.   
                                                                                                                          
5 See id. This latter reasoning typifies the explanations of the current Administration in its actions 
toward Cuba. For example, in its official statement on recent regulatory changes to Cuba travel policy, 
the White House observed these changes would be “a series of steps to continue efforts to reach out to 
the Cuban people in support of their desire to freely determine their country’s future.” Id. 
6 Perhaps one of the most notable scholars of fairness has been philosopher John Rawls whose 
“justice as fairness” principles have been broadly endorsed and applied by legal scholars. See, e.g., 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 151–57 (1977) (applying Rawls’ “justice as fairness” 
model to argue for the legitimacy of treating all human beings with equal concern and respect).  
7 See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 21–29 (1967) (writing to 
explain fairness as a legal principle that is to be distinguished from—and superior to—policy “rules,” 
an examination of case law in which principles of fairness infuse judicial decision-making). 
8 Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Moral Conflict and Political Consensus, 101 ETHICS 64, 
68 (1990) (providing an illuminating elaboration of “fairness” in policy); See generally AMY GUTTMAN 
& DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996). 
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The third section examines how―and why―the travel ban and 
immigration policies continue today, despite dwindling public support9 and 
data documenting their objectives remain unmet.  In particular, this section 
examines how the balsero10 crisis of 1994 and the Helms-Burton Act of 
1996 shaped executive branch actions toward Cuba over the last 15 years.   
Finally, the fourth section explores the scope of executive branch 
discretion and posits that substantial discretion exists within the Executive 
Branch to amend these policy tools; the section continues by outlining 
alternative policies within the present executive powers of the President—
policies that preserve the foreign policy goal of democratizing Cuba, but 
which are more consistent with economic and immigration policies 
adopted towards other nations and nationalities.     
II. CUBAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 
Within almost every nation of the world, there are those striving 
mightily to take up residence in the United States.  Whether they are family 
members of American citizens, applicants for professional positions or 
even refugees and asylum-seekers, a daunting immigration process exists 
through which these aspirants obtain legal entry and residence.  
Immigrants from every country in the world except one—Cuba—ignore 
the legal immigration process at their peril.  For these unwise persons, 
presenting yourself at America’s doorstep would be an invitation to 
deportation.11 
Immigration from Cuba is different.  If you are Cuban and show up at 
a U.S. border without a visa, you are welcomed—even fast-tracked for a 
green card and into the pipeline for citizenship.12  Born of Cold War 
politics, this policy has evolved only slightly in the years since its creation 
in the 1960s and makes immigrants from the island unique among all 
immigrants around the globe in this special treatment.  
                                                                                                                          
9 Public opinion can be gauged in a variety of ways, but no matter the metric you use support for 
the embargo has declined dramatically among US voters in general and Cuban-Americans in particular.  
See, e.g., Cuba Study Group, (Oct. 10, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.cubastudygroup.org/ 
index.cfm/polls (providing a survey of current opinion).   
10 Balsero is the Cuban slang term for “boat person,” and refers to people who board any sort of 
watercraft, sound or not, to cross the Florida Straits in search of US shores.  Balsero, CASSEL’S 
SPANISH DICTIONARY 88 (1978) (defined literally as “ferryman”).  
11 Over the decades of the 20th century, immigration policy evolved more broadly, evidencing a 
variety of biases based on politics and race-based preferencing.  See Charles Ogletree, Jr., America’s 
Schizophrenic Immigration Policy:  Race, Class and Reason, B.C. L. REV. 755, 758–61 (2000).   
12 Clearly there are exceptions for excludable classes of immigrants—like those with violent 
criminal histories—but this process is one that has been uniformly applied for almost all Cubans since 
the 1960s. 
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A. The Cuban Adjustment Act  
As the opposition to the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista spread across 
the Cuban island in the late 1950s, the flow of Cubans immigrating to the 
United States increased. The profile of these immigrants shifted after 
Batista fled in the late hours of December 21, 1958 and Fidel Castro took 
the reins of power. Initially, refugees were Batista loyalists, but over time 
those choosing to emigrate were middle- and upper-class Cubans with no 
particular political connection to Batista.13  They were emigrants deeply 
concerned about their life opportunities under the Castro regime as it listed 
steadily toward communism.14   
In October 1962, as relations soured between the United States and 
Castro over political changes within Cuba, the Cuban government ended 
scheduled flights between the two countries. 15  With the end of regular 
travel for Cuban citizens, the era of the “Cuban refugee” was born.16  For 
the next few years, the United States response to these immigrants can best 
be labeled sympathetic, if ad hoc:  Cuban refugees were characterized by 
the State Department as evidence of Communism’s failure, a useful 
strategy in its Cold War public relations battles.17   
Cuban exiles to the United States were admitted under the Attorney 
General’s general powers of parole, most without immigrant visas, security 
checks or confirmed means of financial support required of other 
immigrants.18  Until 1966, there was no order to this immigration process.19  
That year, in response to the desire to welcome Cuban citizens who were 
fleeing Communist Cuba and to improve on the orderliness of this process, 
Congress passed the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act, a policy that clarified 
and continued the executive policy of admitting Cubans.20    
                                                                                                                          
13 YVONNE M. CONDE, OPERATION PEDRO PAN: THE UNTOLD EXODUS OF 14,048 CUBAN 
CHILDREN 6 (1999).  
14 See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CUBAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED 
STATES: POLICY AND TRENDS 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40566.pdf.  
15 Id. at 1. 
16 See generally CHARLOTTE J. MOORE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ED 206779. REVIEW OF U.S. 
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES tbl. 1, 34–35 (1980) (showing that the number of 
Cuban refugees as of Nov. 2, 1966 elevated significantly); see also Max J. Castro, The New Cuban 
Immigration in Context, 58 U. MIAMI NORTH-SOUTH AGENDA 3 (2002) (supporting the idea that after 
1959 Cuban immigration into the United States skyrocketed).  
17 MARÍA DE LOS ANGELES TORRES, THE LOST APPLE:  OPERATION PEDRO PAN, CUBAN 
CHILDREN IN THE U.S., AND THE PROMISE OF A BETTER FUTURE, 55 (2003).   
18 Wasem, supra note 14, at 1; Deborah Weissman, The Legal Production of the Transgressive 
Family:  Binational Family Relationships Between Cuba and the United States, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 1881, 
1896 (2010). 
19 See Castro, supra note 16, at 5 (“[D]e facto immigration policy of ‘open arms’ was driven by 
the Cold War, active U.S. opposition to Fidel Castro’s rule, and humanitarian concerns. Under this de 
facto policy, the United States instituted a massive visa waiver for Cubans in the early 1960s and paid 
for and organized an orderly departure program for more than 250,000 people, known as the ‘freedom 
flights,’ in place from 1965 to 1973.”).  
20 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970).   
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Under the CAA, any Cuban admitted or paroled into the United States 
by the Attorney General and present for at least two years, was permitted 
to adjust to becoming a permanent resident.21  In practice, this was 
accomplished by having Cubans routinely admitted at the border upon their 
arrival by boat or plane under the Attorney General’s parole process; under 
the CAA, these paroled Cubans would apply two years later for legal 
residence and eventual citizenship.  For the next decade, this policy 
governed as US-chartered “Freedom Flights” and boats continued to 
shuttle Cubans to the United States.22   
In 1976, Congress exempted Cubans who could adjust under the CAA 
from the Immigration and Naturalization Act’s numerical preference 
system,23 and in 1980, again amended the law to reduce the physical 
presence requirement for permanent residence from two years to one.24  
These policies were designed to make it easier for Cubans to emigrate, 
supporting the principle of opposing communism by making its refugees’ 
path to “freedom” as easy as possible.25 
B. The Cuban/American Immigration Agreements of 1994 
 As communism in Europe crumbled, contracted Soviet oil no longer 
arrived on the island, and Cuba’s replacement reserves had to be purchased 
on the open market.26  The loss of Communist markets for sugar meant 
exports dropped precipitously.  Less money for the government meant it 
purchased less for the people—and imports dropped 76 percent in a single 
year.27  In 1990, Castro officially proclaimed Cuba to have entered a 
“special period in peacetime.”28  
By August of 1994, this “special period” had cost Cubans dearly.  
Years of extreme economic deprivation had taken their toll.  Over the 
                                                                                                                          
21 Id.   
22 See Jorge Domínguez, Cooperating with the Enemy?  U.S. Immigration Policies Towards 
Cuba, in WESTERN HEMISPHERE IMMIGRATION AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 31, 34, Table 1 
(Christopher Mitchell ed., 1992) (demonstrating that from 1966 to 1976, approximately 370,000 
Cubans arrived in the United States). 
23 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571 (Codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255).   
24 The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). 
25 The story of the 1980 Mariel refugees—where over 250,000 Cubans took to boats and traversed 
the Florida Straits to US shores—occurred in the context of this policy.  Because it occasioned no legal 
changes, it is beyond the scope of this article, though remains of interest for its evolution of US 
attitudes toward this “exceptionalist” Cuba immigration policy.  See generally Mirta Ojita, The Long 
Voyage from Mariel Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.16, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2005/01/16/weekinreview/16ojito.html.  
26 RICHARD GOTT, CUBA: A NEW HISTORY 287 (2004).  See also Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, 
Immigration Challenges and Opportunities in a Post-Transition Cuba, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 234, 
242–44 (1998). 
27 See GOTT, supra note, 26 at 288. 
28 Id. at 289.    
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previous years, the number of Cubans seeking to escape to the United 
States by sea—the so-called “balseros,” or rafters—had grown steadily.  
The number of US Coast Guard sea rescues of these Cubans had climbed 
from 2,203 in 1991 to 3,656 in 1993.29   
Over the course of the summer in 1994, violent incidents in Cuba 
further fanned flames of discontent.  In June, Cuban authorities shot and 
killed a Cuban who was attempting to escape the island.  A series of boat 
hijackings by Cuban nationals during July and early August resulted in at 
least thirty-seven asylum seekers and two government officials being 
killed.30  On August 5, a food riot erupted in Havana after police dispersed 
an unruly crowd.31   
During the first two weeks of August, the number of balseros rescued 
by the US Coast Guard soared to over 21,000,32 with thousands more 
Cubans taking to  any sort of watercraft to escape.  On August 13, Fidel 
Castro gave a televised speech blaming the United States for the riots and 
violence.  In the speech, he threatened to permit Cubans to leave the 
country freely if the United States did not join in efforts to deter illegal 
boat departures.33 With no response from the United States, Cubans kept 
getting on boats. 
Finally, on August 19, 1994, President Clinton announced—in a 
reversal of a policy in place since the early days of Castro—that the Coast 
Guard would no longer bring Cubans rescued at sea into the United States.   
Intended to deter Cubans from taking their chances at sea, the 
administration explained it would henceforth deliver all balseros to 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base with no opportunity for admission into the 
United States.34   
Within a short time, over 33,000 Cubans were picked up and sent to 
Guantanamo Naval Base.35  The pressures of this crisis and mass 
confinements compelled the United States and Cuba to enter into their first 
serious migration discussions in a generation.36  These talks culminated in 
a modest agreement signed in the midst of the crisis on September 9, 
1994.37  These policies were the first major change to Cuban immigration 
policy since the 1966 CAA.38 
                                                                                                                          
29 Henken, supra note 3, at 398.  
30 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-95-211, CUBA: U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 
CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS 3 (1995).  
31 Id. See also SILVIA PEDRAZA, POLITICAL DISAFFECTION IN CUBA’S REVOLUTION AND EXODUS 
180 (2007). 
32 Henken, supra note 3, at 398.   
33 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 3.  
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 Henken, supra note 3, at 399. 
37 WASEM, supra note 14, at 2.  
38 Id. 
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The goal of the 1994 migration accord was to support safe, legal and 
orderly immigration to the United States.39 To facilitate this goal, the U.S. 
agreed to admit 20,000 Cuban nationals annually, and to stop admitting 
most Cubans intercepted at sea.40 Going forward, U.S. officials would send 
those picked up at sea to a “safe haven” third country; the Cubans agreed 
to use persuasive means to discourage such dangerous routes to emigrate.41 
The unresolved issue of those 33,000 Cubans at Guantanamo and 
concern for future refugees compelled the parties to continue their 
discussions. On May 2, 1995 the two countries entered into a second 
agreement.  In addition to admitting most of the Guantanamo detainees 
into the United States, the U.S. agreed to abandon its brief experiment in 
sending Cuban nationals to third country “safe havens” and instead to 
repatriate those Cuban nationals intercepted at sea who did not assert 
credible asylum claims.42  This second migration accord finalized U.S.-
Cuba talks and represented the biggest changes to Cuban immigration 
policy since 1966.43  
In time, this Clinton Administration policy of repatriating Cubans 
picked up at sea would come to be called the “Wet Foot-Dry Foot” policy. 
Started in August 1994 and formalized through these accords, this 
interdiction policy adopted, for the first time since Castro came to power, a 
policy of forcibly returning Cubans to Cuba. Repatriation, it was believed, 
would discourage those willing to risk their lives in a raft.44  Nonetheless, 
for those Cubans fortunate enough to elude the Coast Guard’s interdiction 
teams, landing on U.S. shores continued to guarantee immediate clearance 
as a legal immigrant—unlike any place else in the world.   
C. Cuban Immigration to United States Following the US/Cuba Accords 
The immediate goal of the 1995 Wet Foot-Dry Foot policy was 
“normalization” of Cuban immigration to the United States.  At the time of 
the agreement between Cuba and the United States, over 30,000 Cubans 
                                                                                                                          
39 Press Statement, Glyn Davies, Acting US Spokesman, Dep’t of State, U.S. – Cuba Migration 
Accords (Aug. 22, 1996), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/ 
press_statements/9608/960822ps.html. 
40 MARK P. SULLIVAN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CUBA ISSUES FOR THE 110TH CONGRESS 48 
(2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33819.pdf.  
41 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-NSIAD-95-211, CUBA U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 
CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS 1, 3–4 (1995); see also WASEM, supra note 14, at 4.  
42 While repatriation became the general rule, Cuban nationals who were able to make the case to 
US officials that they had a well-founded fear of persecution, would still be sent to a third-party state.  
According to the Congressional Research Service, only 170 Cubans were resettled under this policy 
from its start in May 1995 through July 2003.  While the Department of State (“DOS”) is required to 
monitor whether those migrants who are returned to Cuba are subject to reprisals, the Department has 
been unable to monitor returnees outside Havana since March 2003.  WASEM, supra note 14, at 4. 
43 Castro, supra note 16, at 3–7.  
44 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 41, at 3. 
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were interned at Guantanamo, and the threat of another wave of balseros 
was real.  A senior Clinton White House official observed at the time, 
‘‘[w]e think there is a general consensus in the United States that we can’t 
allow people to arrive on our shores in a disorderly, illegal manner.’’45  
This short term policy was a success as the number of balseros 
immediately reduced to a trickle.46 
The Wet Foot-Dry Foot policy continued under President George 
Bush47 and President Barack Obama.48 From the perspective of border 
security, this policy and others embodied in the U.S.-Cuban immigration 
agreement were intended to reduce the number of balseros entering US 
waters. In the months that followed, the policy seemed to achieve this goal:  
In the years immediately following the accords, U.S. Coast Guard 
interdictions of Cubans dropped dramatically.49  The numbers of 
interdictions climbed again in recent years, reaching a twelve-year high of 
2,868 in 2007, but still far below the crisis levels of 1994. 50   
Viewed through the lens of immigration policy, the CAA and the 
antecedent series of ad hoc policy decisions in the early 1960s birthed a 
confusing web of regulations that, by the 1990s were believed by experts 
to have contributed mightily to the balsero crisis.51    The 1994–1995 
accords’ new policy of Wet Foot-Dry Foot introduced a level of clarity for 
those considering the dangerous act of flight in a watercraft across the 
                                                                                                                          
45 Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Will Return Refugees to Cuba in Policy Switch, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 
1995, www.nytimes.com/1995/05/03/world/us-will-return-refugees-to-cuba-in-policy-switch.html. 
46 Henken, supra note 3, at 404 tbl.2. (In 1995, the combined total of interdictions by the Coast 
Guard and arrivals to US shores that evaded Coast guard detection was only 525 persons). 
47 Frank Davies, Bush:  Wet Foot-Dry Foot Policy Will Stay in Place, Miami Herald 1 (Aug. 4, 
2001), available at http://www.cubainfolinks.org/webpage/Articles/wet_dry.htm.  
48 Jeff Franks, Expectations Low Ahead of U.S., Cuba Migration Talks, REUTERS, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/17/us-cuba-usa-migration-
idUSTRE65G6BM20100617?type=politicsNews.  
49 WASEM, supra note 14, at 9–10. 
50 Id. 
51 Henken, supra note 3, at 398 (For a thorough review of how ad hoc US immigration policy 
decisions helped create the balsero crisis, Henken offers up data concerning US Coast Guard 
interdictions and visas granted at the US Interest Section in Havana to understand the crisis).  
 
Between 1987 and 1994, the US Interest Section in Havana issued visas to only 
11,222 (7.1 percent) of the 160,000 maximum allowable number of visas over 
that period (20,000 per year). ‘‘During the same period,’’ however, ‘‘the US 
admitted 13,275 Cubans [mostly rafters] who had arrived in Florida illegally.’’. 
Moreover, as the number of Cubans granted legal immigrant visas gradually 
dropped, the numbers of rafters interdicted rapidly increased. For example, from 
the mid-1980s with an average of 40 annual interceptions of Cuban rafters, 
numbers shot up to 391 in 1989 and 467 in 1990. Then, in the early 1990s, as 
economic impact from lost Soviet aid combined with the already acute lack of 
political and civil liberties on the island, the rafter exodus exploded. USCG sea 
rescues grew from 2,203 in 1991 to 3,656 in 1993. . . .  “The net effect of US 
migration policies toward Cuba in the early 1990s stimulated the illegal or, at 
best, semi-legal entry of Cubans into the US . . . .”  
Id. (citations omitted). 
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Florida Straits.     
In addition, the accords also created three additional pathways of legal 
immigration available to Cubans, a structure that continues to the present 
day.  The first immigrant class consists of those in-country refugees who 
present circumstances that are “of special humanitarian concern to the 
United States.”52  Under this classification, foreign nationals in countries 
designated by the State Department as “special concern” can present 
themselves at a United States embassy and be approved for refugee status 
if they can establish they are:  
 
• Members of persecuted religious minorities; 
• Human rights activists; 
• Former political prisoners; 
• Forced-labor conscripts (1965–1968);  
• Persons deprived of their professional credentials or 
subjected to other disproportionately harsh or 
discriminatory treatment resulting from their perceived 
or actual political or religious beliefs or activities; or 
• Persons who have experienced or fear harm because of 
their relationship—family or social—to someone who 
falls under one of the preceding categories. 53  
 
The United States State Department has explicitly designated Cuba as 
a country of special concern—a rare designation—and allocated almost all 
of the refugee visas—in 2011, approximately 5,000 of the 5,500 such visas 
for all of Latin America—to Cubans applying at the U.S. Interest Section 
in Havana.54 
The second class of immigrants consists of those direct relatives of 
U.S. citizens or permanent residents “who are issued visas each year based 
on the family reunification criteria of US immigration law.”55  Under this 
process, the U.S. citizen or permanent legal resident petitions for the 
immigrant family member, and Cuban family members who pursue this 
route remain subject to global immigration totals, often waiting several 
years before receiving permission to enter the United States under these 
family reunification policies.56 
Finally, the 1994 and 1995 accords established a new visa program, 
                                                                                                                          
52 Pres. Determination No. 2011-17, 76 Fed. Reg. 62,597 (Oct. 11, 2011). 
53 U.S. Refugee Program, U.S. INTEREST SECTION: HAVANA CUBA, (Oct. 13, 2011, 12:02 PM), 
http://havana.usint.gov/refugee_page.html.  
54 Id. (designating Cuba as a country “of special interest”); Pres. Determination  No. 2011-02, 75 
Fed. Reg. 75,851 (Dec. 7, 2010). 
55 See Henken, supra note 3, at 401.  
56 Id.  
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providing for the admission of no less than 20,000 persons annually, 
exclusively for Cubans.57  The Special Cuban Migration Program—known 
colloquially as the Lottery or “el Bombo”—implements this part of the 
accord.58  Any Cuban between the ages of 18 and 55 years of age and who 
meet two of the following three conditions is eligible to apply: (1) have a 
high school degree or its equivalent; (2) have three years of work 
experience; and (3) have family in the United States).59 
Viewed from the purist perspective of anti-communism, Wet Foot-Dry 
Foot was unquestionably a retreat from the cherished goal of providing a 
haven to all fleeing Cubans.60  Viewed from the pragmatic perspective of 
immigration policy analysts that seek general applicability and consistency 
in immigration laws, these 1994 and 1995 accords didn’t go nearly far 
enough in normalizing the unique and anachronistic law of Cuban 
adjustment.61 But this unique system of immigration rules for Cubans 
seemed to work politically for all three Administrations since the 
1994/1995 immigration accords.    
III. TRAVEL TO CUBA 
One pillar of U.S. policy towards “containing” Communist Cuba has 
been immigration; the other key pillar has been an economic embargo that 
has included curbing the unlicensed flow of U.S. citizens travelling to 
Cuba as part of the economic embargo.62  Since the early 1960s, the 
embargo has prohibited most travel to Cuba and dramatically limited the 
remaining classes—humanitarian, religious, journalism and family 
visitation, for example—to only those travelling with licenses from the 
Department of the Treasury.   
                                                                                                                          
57 WASEM, supra note 14, at 2–3.  
58 Henken, supra note 3, at 401. 
59 Id.  at 402.  
60 See, e.g., SILVIA PEDRAZA, POLITICAL DISAFFECTION IN CUBA’S REVOLUTION AND EXODUS 
199–200 (Camb. U. Press 2007) (the “interdiction policy for the ‘wet foot’ does constitute a dramatic 
change in policy.”).  
61 See Deborah Weissman, The Legal Production of the Transgressive Family:  Binational Family 
Relationships Between Cuba and the United States, 88 N. C. L. REV. 1881, 1908–09 (2010); see also 
Henken, supra note 3, at 397–98 (discussing historical background of US policies towards Cuba prior 
to the 1994 and 1995 accords).  
62 In a telling commentary on his meeting with President Clinton at the height of the so-called 
“balsero crisis,” Cuban exile leader Jorge Mas Canosa identified the most important clarifications made 
by Clinton as support for the Cuban Adjustment Act and support for the embargo: “The President of 
the United States reaffirmed last night clearly that he supported the Cuban Adjustment Act [and] that 
he supported the embargo, and that he was not going to permit Castro to attempt to manipulate 
American politics.” JORGE MAS CANOSA, EN BUSCA DE UNA CUBA LIBRE: EDICION COMPLETA DE 
SUS DISCURSOS, ENTREVISTAS, Y DECLARACIONES, VOL. III 1993 – 1997, 1893 (author translation) 
(2003). 
 12 CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:1 
 
A. The Cold War Origins of the Travel Ban to Cuba 
Restrictions on travel to Cuba were first put into place in 1963 when 
the Kennedy Administration issued the first Cuban Assets Control 
Regulations (“CACR”)63 under the authority of the Trading With the 
Enemy Act of 1917 (“TWEA”).64   Section 5(b) of the TWEA gave the 
President broad powers to impose economic restrictions on foreign 
countries at war or during peacetime.65  These 1963 regulations were built 
on an existing series of economic sanctions against Cuba first initiated 
under the Eisenhower Administration in 196066 and continued by 
Kennedy.67  “[E]xcept as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the 
                                                                                                                          
63 31 C.F,R. § 515.415. (1963);  See also MARK P. SULLIVAN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: 
Cuba:  U.S. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL AND REMITTANCES 9 (2011), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31139.pdf . 
64 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 App. U.S.C.A. §. 1.  See Foreign Assets Control, 
Department of the Treasury, 28 Fed. Reg. 6,974 (July 9, 1963). 
65 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 App. U.S.C.A. §5. In 1963, Section 5(b) of TWEA 
provided in relevant part:  
 
(1) During the time of war or during any other period of national 
emergency declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that 
he may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may 
prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise -  
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transactions in foreign exchange, 
transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking 
institution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of 
gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or securities, and  
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or 
prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, 
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any 
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property 
in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest . . . .  
Enacted in 1917—only six months after the United States entered World War I—in its original 
form, TWEA only empowered the President to use these economic restrictions in war time.  See Act of 
Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411.  The Act was expanded in 1933 to grant the President the same 
authority in peacetime “national emergencies.” Act of Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1.  Under this 
statute, the President has delegated authority under TWEA to the Secretary of the Treasury’s Office of 
Foreign Assets Control.  See Exec. Order No. 9193, 3 C.F.R. 1174, 1175 (1942); Treasury Department 
Order No. 128 (Rev. 1, Oct. 15, 1962).  In 1977, Congress reversed itself again limiting Presidential 
authority under Section 5(b) of TWEA to war-time emergencies, and enacting a new law to cover the 
President’s powers in response to peacetime crises.  Accordingly, Cuba embargo regulations remained 
permissible.  At first, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) required the 
President to extend their exercise at one-year intervals provided that such an extension “is in the 
national interest.” See International Emergency Economic Power Act, Pub.L. 95-223, § 101, 91 Stat. 
1625 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706). The Helms-Burton Act of 1996, codified at 22 
U.S.C. §§ 6021-24, 6031-46, 6061-67, 6081-85 & 6091, revised this annual requirement, proscribing 
that the President may only lift the embargo when specific criteria are met. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6061, 
6064-6066.  
66 United States Institutes Controls on Exports to Cuba, DEP’T ST. BULL., Nov. 7, 1960, at 715 
(denying export licenses to most industrial exports to Cuba). 
67 See, e. g., Cuban Import, 27 Fed. Reg. 1,116 (1962) (total embargo on imports from Cuba).   
See generally, Report of the Special Committee to Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the Eighth 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OEA/Ser. G/IV, 14–16 (1963); Cuba, Dept. of 
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Treasury,” Regulation 201(b) prohibited all “transactions involv[ing] 
property in which [Cuba has] . . . any interest of any nature whatsoever, 
direct or indirect . . . .”68  The breadth of this language empowered the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) to interpret these “trade” 
regulations to cover not just standard trade between nations, but also to 
extend to travel-related expenditures that effectively made illegal all but 
fully-hosted travel to Cuba.   
These travel limitations were eventually challenged and in Regan v. 
Wald, a divided Supreme Court found the regulations constitutional.69  In 
general, the Supreme Court had previously held that the Constitution 
created a liberty of travel for US nationals that could not be abridged 
without due process of law. 70   In the 1965 Zemel v. Rusk case, the Court 
rejected a challenge to the State Department’s refusal to validate the 
passport of US citizens for travel to Cuba,71 distinguishing an 
unconstitutional government prohibition of travel against a specific citizen 
from a constitutional government ban on travel to a specific nation—
Cuba—that was applied equally to all citizens:   
 
                                                                                                                          
State Pub. No. 7171, pp. 25–36 (1961). See also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1984); Zemel 
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1965). 
68 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (2006).  A complete version of §515.201(b) gives even more context: 
 
(b) All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as specifically 
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury (or any person, agency, or 
instrumentality designated by him) by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, 
licenses, or otherwise, if such transactions involve property in which any foreign 
country designated under this part, or any national thereof, has at any time on or 
since the effective date of this section had any interest of any nature whatsoever, 
direct or indirect: 
    (1) All dealings in, including, without limitation, transfers, withdrawals, 
or exportations of, any property or evidences of indebtedness or evidences of 
ownership of property by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States; and 
    (2) All transfers outside the United States with regard to any property or 
property interest subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
    (c) Any transaction for the purpose or which has the effect of evading or 
avoiding any of the prohibitions set forth in paragraph (a) or (b) of this section is 
hereby prohibited. 
    (d) For the purposes of this part, the term foreign country designated 
under this part and the term designated foreign country mean Cuba and the term 
effective date and the term effective date of this section mean with respect to 
Cuba, or any national thereof, 12:01 a.m., e.s.t., July 8, 1963. 
    (e) When a transaction results in the blocking of funds at a banking 
institution pursuant to this section and a party to the transaction believes the 
funds have been blocked due to mistaken identity, that party may seek to have 
such funds unblocked pursuant to the administrative procedures set forth in §. 
501.806 of this chapter.   
69 Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984). 
70 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (“right to travel is a part of the “liberty” of which the 
citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment”). 
71 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 3. 
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It must be remembered . . . that the issue involved in [the 
passport challenges] was whether a citizen could be denied 
a passport because of his political beliefs or associations. . 
. . In this case, however, the Secretary has refused to 
validate appellant’s passport not because of any 
characteristic peculiar to appellant, but rather because of 
foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens.72  
 
Accordingly, across-the-board travel restrictions were found to 
implicate no First Amendment protections, and the Fifth Amendment right 
to travel standing alone was held to be insufficient to withstand important 
foreign policy justifications in support of the restriction: 
 
That the restriction which is challenged in this case is 
supported by the weightiest considerations of national 
security is perhaps best pointed up by recalling that the 
Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 preceded the filing of 
appellant’s complaint by less than two months.73  
 
Subsequent interpretation from the Supreme Court has made clear that 
the long shadow of nuclear holocaust—a clear and concerning 
preoccupation in the 1960s—need not be demonstrated by the Executive 
Branch to justify its restriction of such travel.  In general, courts have 
followed the well-settled principal of judicial deference accorded to 
executive branch activities in the arena of foreign relations  Further, when 
the Executive Branch was acting under a Congressional grant of power, 
principles of legislative intent further forbade the Court  from second-
guessing the application of the OFAC regulations.74  
                                                                                                                          
72 Id. at 13. 
73 Id. at 16. 
74 In  1984 the Court elaborated: 
 
In the opinion of the State Department, Cuba, with the political, economic, 
and military backing of the Soviet Union, has provided widespread support for 
armed violence and terrorism in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba also maintains 
close to 40,000 troops in various countries in Africa and the Middle East in 
support of objectives inimical to United States foreign policy interests.  Given 
the traditional deference to executive judgment “[i]n this vast external realm,” 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936), we think 
there is an adequate basis under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
to sustain the President’s decision to curtail the flow of hard currency to Cuba—
currency that could then be used in support of Cuban adventurism—by 
restricting travel.” 
Regan, 468 U.S. at242 (citations omitted); see also U.S. v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1309 (2000) 
(discussing TWEA and 1977’s IEPA as requiring substantial deference to executive).  
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B. The Evolution of Regulatory Restrictions on Cuba Travel 
In the years that followed the 1963 promulgation of the Cuba travel 
ban, most attention on Cuba was focused on its emerging relationship with 
the Soviet Union and the steady flow of refugees leaving the island.  The 
travel ban effectively eliminated almost all travel to Cuba. 
In 1977, the election of President Carter brought with it a new 
perspective on Cuba.  Early in his term, he acted to amend the CACR by 
adding Regulation 560.75  This new regulation created a general license 
permitting all “persons who visit Cuba to pay for their transportation and 
maintenance expenditures (meals, hotel bills, taxis, etc.) while in Cuba.”76   
The general license required no advance approval by OFAC and, 
overnight, those wishing to travel to Cuba found themselves largely 
exempted from the embargo.77  Under the Carter-era general license 
provisions, persons engaging in travel-related “transactions” were only 
required to make “a full and accurate record of each such transaction” and 
to keep those records for at least two years.78  Further, the general license 
remained subject to revocation or modification “at any time.”79  
Republican Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980 signaled a broad shift 
rightward from his Democratic predecessor, particularly towards 
containing Communism. Moreover, leaders in the Cuban exile community 
began to shift their strategies.  During these early years of the Reagan 
Administration, they founded the Cuban American National Foundation, 
located in Miami, Florida and Washington, DC, to lobby for restrictions on 
trade and travel with Cuba.80  Unsurprisingly, the Carter-era relaxation of 
the Cuba travel ban soon came under scrutiny.   
In 1982, Reagan amended Regulation 560 to end general licenses in 
order to “reduce Cuba’s hard currency earnings from travel by U.S. 
persons to and within Cuba.”81  The new Regulation 560 licensed only 
                                                                                                                          
75 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1977).  Regulation 560 was promulgated first on March 29, 1977, Cuban 
Assets Control Regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 16,621, then amended on May 18, 1977 to relax then-existing 
Cuba travel restrictions even further. Cuban Assets Control Regulations 42 Fed. Reg. 25,499 (May 18, 
1977). 
76 Cuban Assets Control Regulation, 42 Fed. Reg. 16,621 (Mar. 29, 1977). 
77 Not all restrictions were lifted.  For example, travelers were limited to $100 in their purchases 
of merchandise while in Cuba, and such goods could only be for personal use and not resold.  31 C.F.R. 
§ 515.560(a)(3) (1977). In addition, contracts between US credit cards and Cuban enterprises “for the 
extension of credit to any traveler” were still prohibited, 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(7) (1977), as was 
regular air and sea travel, 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(5) (1977). 
78 31 C.F.R. § 515.601 (1977). 
79 31 C.F.R. § 515.805 (1977). 
80 See Damián J. Fernández, From Little Havana to Washington, D.C.: Cuban-Americans and 
U.S. Foreign Policy, in ETHNIC GROUPS AND FOREIGN POLICY 115, 124–25 (Mohammed E. Ahrari ed., 
1987). 
81 Regulation 560 was actually amended twice—after the initial modifications to the general 
license, it was amended again in July of that year to further clarify the scope of permissible travel-
related transactions with Cuba. Cuban Assets Control Regulation, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,030 (April 20, 1982) 
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travel-related economic transactions within a narrow set of categories, such 
as diplomatic visits, journalism, professional research, and visits to close 
relatives.82  Explicitly prohibited in the new Cuban Asset Control 
Regulations were general tourist and business travel.83  These regulations 
were to remain in place until the next Democratic administration in the 
mid-1990s. 
IV. CUBA POLICY OVER THE LAST 15 YEARS:  BALSEROS, HELMS-BURTON 
AND OTHER FIG LEAFS 
Like a house of cards, Communism in the Eastern Bloc collapsed with 
amazing speed.  From the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in 1991:  One by one, the Communist states in Europe 
abandoned their ideologies and pursued market-based economies. These 
changes forced profound change on Cuba, but also invited the United 
States to reexamine many of its foreign policy priorities based in Cold War 
assumptions—including its Cuba embargo.   
A. The Early 1990s:  Growing Comfortable with Ending Cold War Cuba 
Policy in a Post-Communist World 
The election of Bill Clinton in 1992 signaled the possibility of changes 
in Cuba policy for the first time in over a decade.84  Indeed, change to the 
travel ban began fast. In his first year, Clinton authorized OFAC to create 
two new classes of specific licenses through which U.S. citizens could 
travel legally to Cuba.85  The first category permitted licensed travel to 
Cuba “for clearly defined educational or religious activities.” The second 
category permitted travel “for activities of recognized human rights 
organizations.”86  The Cuban-American lobby strongly opposed this effort 
to loosen the travel restrictions, but the anti-Communist rationale that 
swayed previous presidents since the Cold War Era was no longer there.  
A year later, the flood of Cubans into American waters during the 
balsero crisis forced President Clinton to challenge another sacred cow of 
the Cuban-American anti-Castro lobby:  the Cuban Adjustment Act.  This 
law’s authorization of an open-door immigration policy for Cubans was 
elevated to the national stage when the balsero crisis caused the Clinton 
                                                                                                                          
(to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515); 47 Fed. Reg. 32,060 (July 23, 1982) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt 
515).  
82 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(1) (1983). 
83 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(3) (1983). 
84 See e.g., MAS CANOSA, supra note 58, at 718–19 (indicating discussion amongst Cuban exile 
circles about the position this new administration would take, understanding that their interest group 
did not have the sway with Democrats that it had with Republicans). 
85 SULLIVAN, supra note 63, at 10.  
86 Id.  
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Administration to fear disastrous outcomes akin to the Mariel boatlift a 
decade before.87 Ultimately, Clinton’s adoption of the Wet Foot-Dry Foot 
policy in August 1994 would close the “open door” policy—or at least 
close it halfway.  While still accepting all Cubans who touch ground in the 
United States (the “dry foot”), the policy instituted an interdiction practice 
that forcibly returned all balseros found at sea (the “wet foot”) to Cuba.88  
Even while special immigration programs for Cubans remained,89 many 
Cuban exiles saw this shift as a betrayal of the US government’s historic 
anti-Communist commitments to welcome all who fled Castro’s Cuba.90   
Changes to both the travel ban and Cuban immigration policy 
evidenced a growing comfort among Executive Branch officials to shift 
away from Cold War-era Cuba policies. This comfort in moving away 
from Cuban exceptionalism was soon to end in fire, smoke and bombast. 
B. Turning Back the Clock:  Brothers to the Rescue and the Helms-Burton 
Act 
On February 24, 1996 Cuban MiGs scrambled into flight on reports of 
unauthorized aircraft entering Cuban airspace. Minutes later, these 
warplanes shot down two small, civilian aircrafts—one in Cuban 
airspace—piloted by anti-Castro activists.91  Despite having given ample 
warnings to Brothers to the Rescue following prior incursions into their 
airspace, the Cuban actions prompted hostility and outrage among Cuban-
Americans in the United States, as well as a swift response from the 
Republican-led United States Congress. 92 Overnight, Cuban exile activists 
resurrected Cold War policy from history’s dustbin, culminating in the 
passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act 
of 1996, known better as the Helms-Burton Act.93  President Clinton 
                                                                                                                          
87 See Ojita supra note 25.   
88 Henken, supra note 3, at 409. 
89 See Id. 
90See FELIX MASUD-PILOTO, FROM WELCOMED EXILES TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS: CUBAN 
MIGRANTS TO THE US, 1959–1995 141 (1996) (calling these changes ‘‘a complete reversal of a thirty-
five-year-old immigration policy designed to welcome as political refugees almost any Cuban who 
claimed to be ‘escaping’ Fidel Castro’s repression’’).  The argument that the administration was “soft” 
on Cuba linked its earlier easing of the travel ban to this effort to change immigration policy.  Some 
point to the Torricelli Act, known formally as the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 
106 Stat. 2575, 2578 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6005(c) (2006)) as an example of Clinton remaining 
“tough”.  In truth, this was a legislative effort and OFAC acted to toughen its regulations, Cuban Assets 
Control Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 49,847, (Oct. 2, 1991) (codified at 31 CFR pt. 515), as required by 
this legislative initiative.  
91 See Phillip Brenner, Patrick J. Haney & Walter Vanderbush, The Confluence of Domestic and 
International Interests: U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 1998–2001, 3 INT’L STUDS. PERPS. 192, 194 (2002) 
(highlighting role of exile group “Brothers to the Rescue”). 
92 U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the Shooting Down of Two U.S.-Registered Private Civil 
Aircraft by Cuban Military Aircraft on 24 February 1996 86–90, 140, U.N. Doc. S/1996/509 (July 1, 
1996).  
93 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 1, 
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acknowledged as much in his comments at the signing ceremony of the 
Helms-Burton Act:  “The legislation I sign today further tightens [the] 
embargo.  It sends a strong message to the Cuban government [that]…we 
will stand both with those inside and outside Cuba who are working for a 
peaceful transition to freedom and democracy.”94  In practical terms, the 
Brothers to the Rescue incident and the Helms-Burton Act largely halted 
the trend away from exceptionalist policies regarding Cuba—both for 
those seeking to come to the United States as immigrants, and for 
Americans seeking to travel to Cuba.95  The law’s long shadow would 
shape—for better or for worse—the policy landscape of United 
States/Cuban relations for the next 15 years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
110 Stat. 785, (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (2006)).  In this article, I discuss generally the importance 
of the Helms Burton Act and do not discuss in any depth its antecedent, the Cuba Democracy Act of 
1992, known more commonly as the Torricelli Act. See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-484, §§ 1701-12, 106 Stat. 2575 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001–10 (2006).  The Torricelli Act 
extended the reach of the embargo until the Helms Burton Act expanded the restrictions even further in 
1996.  While it was a significant step towards toughening the law, the Torricelli Act did not stop the 
trend toward executive branch drift away from tough enforcement of these regulations. 
94 HANEY & VANDERBUSH, supra note 2, at 99. 
95 One exception to this tilt back towards “tough” Cuba embargo policy was a brief loosening in 
the travel regulations in the late 1990s to permit educational “people to people” travel.  This broadening 
of the educational class of travel was eliminated soon after the election of George W. Bush in 2000. 
Cuban Assets Control Regulations: Sales of Food and Agricultural Inputs, 64 Fed. Reg. 25,808 (May 
13, 1999) (to be codified at 31 CFR p. 515). 
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Figure 1: Major Events in the Development of the U.S. Economic 
Embargo on Cuba, 1960–200896 
 
 
 
Primarily focused on toughening economic sanctions against Cuba, 
Helms-Burton’s controversial penalization of other countries doing 
business with Cuba was the main focus of debate during its passage.97  The 
law extended the 1992 Cuba Democracy Act—also called the Torricelli 
Act—by further regulating third-party transactions with Cuba.98  It also 
                                                                                                                          
96DAVID GOOTNICK, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-592R, U.S. EMBARGO ON 
CUBA: RECENT REGULATORY CHANGES AND POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL OR CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS 
at 8, fig. 1(2009). 
97 See, e.g., Bush Waives Controversial Portion of Helms-Burton Law, CNN.COM (July 16, 2001), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2001-07-16/politics/bush.cuba_1_helms-burton-act-democratic-solidarity-act-
cuba-policy?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS.  
98 See 22 U.S.C. § 6033 (2006). 
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directed the Executive Branch to work to oppose Cuba’s membership in 
international financial institutions.99 
Title III and Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act reached even further to 
give legal standing to US nationals who have claims to expropriated 
property in Cuba to sue in U.S. court any foreign person who deals in US 
property confiscated by the Cuban government,100 and by requiring the 
State Department to withhold visas from foreign businessmen doing 
business with Cuba.101 The goals of these provisions were to isolate Cuba 
by discouraging investment by non-U.S. corporations—a strategy that data 
does not support having worked.102  In response, many corporations spun 
off their Cuba investment into separate companies so that the parent 
companies’ assets were not at risk,103 or they simply ignored the policy.104  
The extraordinary reach of these two provisions have been highly 
controversial with US allies like Canada and the European Union, and have 
never been fully implemented105 in the wake of heavy criticism both 
internationally and domestically.106 
In addition to these specific trade-related mandates, Section 102 of the 
Act explicitly “codified” the embargo.  The bill language specifically gave 
the force of law to “all restrictions” in effect under the Cuban Asset 
Control Regulations (“CACR”).107  Travel restrictions enforced by OFAC 
are part of these CACR regulations, and thus were codified in their then-
current form allowing for broad discretion by the President to establish 
such categories and limitations on travel to Cuba.108 
Section 112 of the Helms-Burton Act includes specific statutory 
language concerning the travel ban.109  In pertinent part, this language does 
                                                                                                                          
99 See Id. at § 6034. 
100 See Id. at § 6082 . 
101 See Id. at § 6091. 
102 Paolo Spadoni, The Impact of the Helms-Burton Legislation on Foreign Investment in Cuba, 
11 ASSOC. OF STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY PROCEEDINGS 18, 34–35 (2001)(while foreign  
investment remains low in Cuba, it doesn’t appear to have been impacted by Helms Burton). 
103 Id. at 32. 
104 Id. at 28. 
105 See Christopher Marquis, Bush Forgoes Trying to Bar Cuba Deals by Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES 
July 17, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/17/world/bush-forgoes-trying-to-bar-cuba-deals-by-
foreigners.html?ref=cuba (Bush continues Clinton Administration refusal to enforce Section III of 
Helms Burton Act).  
106 See Christopher Marquis, Congressional Leaders Approve a Deal to Allow Food Sales to 
Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/28/us/congressional-leaders-
approve-a-deal-to-allow-food-sales-to-cuba.html?ref=cuba. 
107 22 U.S.C. § 6032(h) (Pub. L. 104-114) (2000). 
108 See 22 U.S.C.  §6032(c)(2006). 
109 Id. at § 6042. Section 112 of the Helms Burton Act reads in its entirety:  
 
REINSTITUTION OF FAMILY REMITTANCES AND TRAVEL TO 
CUBA 
It is the sense of the Congress that the President should— 
(1)(A) before considering the reinstitution of general licenses for family 
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not limit the executive authority on determining who can travel to Cuba.  
Instead, Congress directs that  
 
the President should. . . before considering the 
reinstitution of general licenses for travel to Cuba by 
individuals resident in the United States who are family 
members of Cuban nationals who are resident in Cuba, 
insist on such actions by the Cuban Government as 
abrogation of the sanction for departure from Cuba by 
refugees, release of political prisoners, recognition of the 
right of association, and other fundamental freedoms.110 
 
The use of the permissive “should” instead of the mandatory “shall” 
reaffirms again that the Congress intended to incorporate the Presidential 
discretion already in CACR into its codification of the embargo.   
The relatively minor impact of the Helms-Burton Act on the travel ban 
regulations has been widely misunderstood.111  Many in Congress—on 
both sides of the debate—indicated that the bill would codify (and 
therefore tighten) travel restrictions to Cuba.112  Executive officials have 
similarly parroted this message that the law limits executive discretion—
including rulemaking and policy development—as a result of 
codification.113  This misapprehension has been repeated by government 
officials114 and academics,115 further perpetuating the myth of legislative 
                                                                                                                          
remittances to Cuba, insist that, prior to such reinstitution, the Cuban 
Government permit the unfettered operation of small businesses fully 
empowered with the right to hire others to whom they may pay wages and to buy 
materials necessary in the operation of the businesses, and with such other 
authority and freedom as are required to foster the operation of small businesses 
throughout Cuba; and 
(B) if licenses described in subparagraph (A) are reinstituted, require a 
specific license for remittances described in subparagraph (A) in amounts of 
more than $500; and (2) before considering the reinstitution of general licenses 
for travel to Cuba by individuals resident in the United States who are family 
members of Cuban nationals who are  resident in Cuba, insist on such actions by 
the Cuban Government as abrogation of the sanction for departure from Cuba by 
refugees, release of political prisoners, recognition of the right of association, 
and other fundamental freedoms (emphasis added). 
110 Id. (emphasis added). 
111 A strong indictment of Helms Burton optics having inordinate impact on policy making can be 
found in the New Ideas Fund report to President Obama.  See Jake Colvin, The Case for a New Cuba 
Policy, NEW IDEAS FUND at 29, http://www.newideasfund.org/proposals/Colvin%20-%20Cuba%20-
%20Master.pdf. 
112 142 CONG. REC. 29, 3801 (1996).  
113 Saul Hudson, Castro Handover Seen Unlikely to Change US Policy, REUTERS Aug. 1, 2006, 
available at http://cuba.blogspot.com/2006/08/castro-handover-seen-unlikely-to.html 
114 Most prominently is the widely-relied upon Congressional Research Service-commissioned 
report by Mark Sullivan. Sullivan explicitly states:  
 
Lifting all the restrictions on travel, however, would require legislative action. 
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“codification” by the Helms-Burton Act.   
C. Codifying the Cold War At Last: The Trade Sanctions Reform and 
Export Enhancement Act of 2000  
After languishing in Congress for years, a bill seeking to permit the 
export of agricultural products to Cuba finally found its legs in 2000.  
Passed as part of the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug 
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, its provisions 
finally opened the door for the commercial sale of some US-produced 
foodstuffs to Cuba and other nations despite existing economic 
sanctions.116  Called the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement 
Act of 2000 (“TSREEA”),117 the law went further than its stated focus on 
agricultural exports to include specific restrictions on travel.118 As the 
                                                                                                                          
This is because of the codification of the embargo in Section 102(h) of the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114); that act 
conditions the lifting of the embargo, including the travel restrictions, on the 
fulfillment of certain democratic conditions in Cuba.  Although the 
Administration retains flexibility through licensing authority to ease travel 
restrictions, the President may not lift all restrictions on travel as set forth in the 
CACR.  
SULLIVAN, supra note 63, at 3 (emphasis added). 
115  In general, the codification of other trade-related policies, together with the explicit definition 
of what constitutes the conditions in Cuba to provide the President with discretion to end these 
statutorily-required restrictions have led legal scholars and other academics to conclude that a broader 
scope of codification—including a limitation on executive discretion on travel-resulted from the 
passage of Helms Burton.  See, e.g., Deborah Weissman, The Legal Production of the Transgressive 
Family:  Binational Family Relationships between Cuba and the United States, 88 N. CAR. L. REV. 
1881, 1906 (2010) (“The Helms-Burton Act expanded restrictions, added new sanctions, and codified 
all aspects of the embargo, thereby prohibiting the executive branch from easing the restrictions 
without an act of Congress.”) (emphasis added); Spadoni, supra note 102, at 18 (“codifying the existing 
restrictions that collectively formed the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba, the Helms-Burton law 
aimed to complicate Havana’s access to external financing”); see also José M. Gabilondo, Cuban 
Claims: Embargoed Identities and the Cuban-American Oedipal Conflict (El Grito De La Yuma), 9 
RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 335, 354 (2008) (asserting that Helms-Burton Act statutorily requires a “big 
bang” transition to democracy in Cuba “as a precondition to lifting the embargo”); Roland Estevez, 
Modern Application of the Cuban Adjustment Act and Helms-Burton: Adding Insult to Injury. 30 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1273, 1289 (2002) (“The persistence of Helms-Burton in light of its categorical 
failures portrays the legislation as the codification of a monumental grudge”). 
116 H.R. 5426, 106th Cong. § 910(a) (1999-2000) (including TRSEEA as Title IX of H.R 5426).  
See generally, Raymond Ahern and Vivian Jones, RL30227: Trade Legislation in the 106th Congress: 
An Overview, Cong. Rsch. Service (March 7, 2011) (Congressional Research Service summary of bill 
scope), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:HR05426:@@@L&summ2=m&. 
117 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006). 
118 Jake Colvin explains the logic behind the legislation thus: 
 
In exchange for exempting humanitarian trade from the embargo, pro-embargo 
members of Congress championed a provision that prohibits the executive 
branch from licensing “travel to, from, or within Cuba for tourist activities.” As a 
result, one of the most logical steps the next president might wish to take, lifting 
the travel ban, likely would require an act of Congress. “This time, Mr. Diaz-
Balart got it right,” says Robert Muse, a Washington attorney who advises 
businesses on Cuba. 
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legislative history explains, TSREEA’s goals were to encompass both 
“trade and travel restrictions with Cuba….”119   
Although not the primary focus of the bill, language was included to 
limit travel to Cuba.120  In relevant part, the language specifically excluded 
all “tourist-related travel.”121  The law defined “tourist-related travel” as 
“any activity…not expressly authorized” by the then-current OFAC travel 
regulations “either by a general license or on a case-by-case basis by a 
specific license.”122  This language referred to the twelve administratively-
created classes of travel that existed at the time of this law’s passage, thus 
codifying them.123  
                                                                                                                          
Colvin, supra note 111, at 21. 
119 H.R. 5426, 106th Cong., (1999) (enacted). 
120 22 U.S.C. § 7209 (2006).  The section reads in its entirety: 
 
Requirements relating to certain travel-related transactions with Cuba. 
    (a) Authorization of travel relating to commercial sales of agricultural 
and medical goods.  The Secretary of the Treasury shall promulgate regulations 
under which the travel-related transactions listed in subsection (c) of section 
515.560 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, may be authorized on a case-
by-case basis by a specific license for travel to, from, or within Cuba for the 
commercial export sale of agricultural commodities pursuant to the provisions of 
this chapter. 
    (b) Prohibition on travel relating to tourist activities 
      (1) In general. Notwithstanding any other provision of law or 
regulation, the Secretary of the Treasury, or any other Federal official, may not 
authorize the travel-related transactions listed in subsection (c) of section 
515.560 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, either by a general license or 
on a case-by-case basis by a specific license for travel to, from, or within Cuba 
for tourist activities. 
      (2) Definition. In this subsection, the term “tourist activities” means 
any activity with respect to travel to, from, or within Cuba that is not expressly 
authorized in subsection (a) of this section, in any of paragraphs (1) through (12) 
of section 515.560 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, or in any section 
referred to in any of such paragraphs (1) through (12) (as such sections were in 
effect on June 1, 2000). 
121 Id. at §7209(b). 
122 Id. at §7209(b)(2). 
123 The twelve categories of travel codified for either general or specific licenses by the TRSEEA 
include:  
 
(1) Family visits (general and specific licenses) (see §515.561);  
(2) Official business of the U.S. government, foreign governments, and certain 
intergovernmental organizations (general license) (see §515.562); 
(3) Journalistic activity (general and specific licenses) (see §515.563); 
(4) Professional research and professional meetings (general and specific 
licenses) (see §515.564); 
(5) Educational activities (specific licenses) (see §515.565); 
(6) Religious activities (specific licenses) (see §515.566); 
(7) Public performances, athletic and other competitions, and exhibitions 
(specific licenses) (see §515.567);  
(8) Support for the Cuban people (specific licenses) (see §515.574); 
(9) Humanitarian projects (specific licenses) (see §515.575); 
(10) Activities of private foundations or research or educational institutes 
(specific licenses) (see §515.576); 
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The effect of this language was to accomplish something that the 
Helms-Burton Act was unable to achieve despite its sponsors’ anti-Castro 
zeal:  the codification of the travel ban.124  After nearly forty years of 
existing solely at the discretion of the President, the travel restrictions were 
now law.  
How Congress codified the travel ban, however, was less clear.  Travel 
was still permitted, but only by general or specific licenses under any of 
the enumerated license categories.  Because the statute was silent on how 
OFAC makes determinations within these twelve categories, it is presumed 
that the President, through OFAC, retains the discretion to determine 
which of the twelve categories will be subject to general license 
requirements and which subject to more onerous specific–or “case-by-
case”–review. Consistent with this interpretation of TSREEA, OFAC has 
in recent years changed existing categories from the specific license 
requirement to general licenses.125    
In addition, OFAC has taken the position that, within these existing 
twelve categories, it has the power to narrow or widen the applicable class 
of activity and, correspondingly, narrow or broaden the numbers of 
individuals eligible to travel to Cuba. For example, pursuant to an 
announcement by President Obama in January 2011, OFAC broadened the 
journalist category to include freelance writers.126   
Such OFAC actions show that, despite codification of the travel ban, 
travel remains far from banned; instead, efforts to limit or expand travel 
occur within the regulatory domain of OFAC regulation as conscripted by 
the then-existing regulatory regime of 2000—a conscription which limits  
the executive from making a wholesale administrative repeal of the travel 
ban, but not from making substantial changes to its current scope. 
                                                                                                                          
(11) Exportation, importation, or transmission of information or informational 
materials (specific licenses) (see §515.545); and 
(12) Certain export transactions that may be considered for authorization under 
existing Department of Commerce regulations and guidelines with respect to Cuba or 
engaged in by U.S.–owned or controlled foreign firms (general and specific licenses) 
(see §§515.533 and 515.559). 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (2010). 
124 Section 515.560(b) explicitly permitted the President to create new classes of licensees in 
addition to the 12 codified by TRSEEA. 64 Fed. Reg. 25,814. § 515.560(b) (“Travel–related 
transactions in connection with activities other than those referenced in paragraph (a) of this section 
may be authorized on a case–by–case basis by a specific license issued pursuant to § 515.801.”)  This 
discretion to create more categories is, accordingly, eliminated. 
125 See, e.g., Cuban Asset Control Regulations, 76 Fed. Reg. 5072, 5073 (Jan. 28, 2011) 
(amending OFAC regulation Section 515.566 that required religious organizations to receive a specific 
license to only require a general license).   
126 Cuban Asset Control Regulations, 76 Fed. Reg. 5072, 5074 (Jan. 28, 2011) (amending section 
515.563(b) to “increase the scope of the statement of specific licensing policy for journalistic activities 
in Cuba to include free-lance journalistic projects other than ‘articles.’”). 
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D.  Presidential Action on Current Cuban Immigration Policies 
Unlike travel restrictions to Cuba, there have been few changes to the 
immigration framework since the 1995 migration accords. Wet Foot-Dry 
Foot remains the law of the land, and the prospects for “normalization” –a 
term used among immigration officials meant to describe regularizing 
policy on Cubans such that they are treated like other foreign nationals—
are dim.127 
Current changes in Cuba-including the prospect of reform with the 
transition in leadership to Raul Castro—have strengthened support for the 
Cuban Adjustment Act so as not to “send the wrong message” by 
abandoning its exceptional treatment of those Cubans who manage to reach 
the United States.128 While the extant discretion remains for the President 
to exert substantial power in redrawing these immigration policies if he so 
chooses, there has been little appetite to adjust the lines of this policy 
debate.129 
V. ENDING THE UNFAIR AND ILLOGICAL CUBAN EXCEPTIONALISM 
Not only does pragmatic assessment of the failed Communist-era 
policy recommend change, but the moral guidepost of fairness strongly 
forces the hand of the administration to act in its discretion to normalize 
these policies.  National security necessity cited under the Trading with the 
Enemy Act130 to “trump” the fairness argument and standard international 
travel regulations makes little sense in a post-Communist era. At least as 
urgent is the need to address the unfair and failed Cuban Adjustment Act.  
The unique and privileged position of the Cuban seeking to immigrate to 
the United States under Wet Foot-Dry Foot offends the principle of 
fairness when no other immigrant from anywhere else in the world is 
treated with this exceptional brand of welcome.  Indeed, at a time when 
immigrants are denominated and differentiated so painstakingly as “legal” 
and “illegal,” the creation of a special legal category for Cubans in which 
                                                                                                                          
127 WASEM, supra note 14, at 1.  
128 Id. at 17.  
129 But see Juan O. Tamaya, Rivera Seeks to Restrict Some Cubans from Returning to Cuba, 
MIAMI HERALD, (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/08/16/v-
fullstory/2362137/rivera-seeks-to-restrict-some.html (The author describes a recent effort by at least 
one staunch anti-Communist Cuban-American Congressman, Rep. David Rivera, to repeal the Cuban 
Adjustment Act through a bill filed on August 1, 2011. See also Associated Press, Congressman wants 
change to Cuban Adjustment Act, VIVA COLORADO, (AUG. 17, 2011), http://www.vivacolorado.com/ 
comunidad/ci_18702039?source=pkg (describing Rivera’s efforts as seeking to penalize Cuban-born 
citizens for use of a loophole whereby they adjust their status as refugees and still continue to visit their 
families in Cuba, and mentioning broad opposition to Rivera’s bill, including from the Cuban-
American National Foundation.).   
130 Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 App. USC § 5 (2006).   
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they are –by definition—always legal cannot withstand fairness critique.131   
With both sound policy and fairness principles counseling 
policymakers to reset course on Cuba, the question of legislation comes to 
mind. But the curious politics of Cuban policy frustrate any sincere attempt 
of policy modification and have for nearly fifty years.  Accordingly, the 
question of policy change turns to the Executive Branch.      
A. Executive Branch Repeal of Travel Restrictions to the Extent  
Permitted by TSREEA 
The Administration can and should discontinue travel restrictions to 
the extent possible under TSREEA. In relevant part, the 2000 law’s 
codification of twelve classes of travel prohibits wholesale elimination of 
the travel ban. Nonetheless, broad discretion remains to open up these 
categories to more US citizens desiring to travel to Cuba. This discretion 
permits a substantial reduction in scope of this barrier to travel. 
The authority of the executive branch under TSREEA to define which 
groups are eligible within the extant twelve classes of licensees is 
substantial. The OFAC regulation-changes that followed the announcement 
of President Barack Obama in January 2011 demonstrate the substantial 
powers reserved for the President’s discretion.  As part of these changes, 
Section 515.563 was amended to expand the specific license journalist 
category to permit freelance writers working on “projects other than 
‘articles’.”132  This new language broadens substantially the types of 
persons who can travel under this category.  Anyone can be a freelance 
journalist; moreover, without the requirement that you have an article to be 
published, there is no check on such applicants or requirement that they 
secure a publisher in advance, thus allowing for individuals to characterize 
their travel as journalistic without the need to seriously demonstrate such 
an endeavor before or after such travel. 133    
Other categories lend themselves to such “broad” interpretation, too.  
The new general license for religion, for example, permits “[r]eligious 
organizations located in the United States, including members and staff of 
such organizations,… to engage in the travel-related transactions…”134  As 
                                                                                                                          
131 It is just as much the responsibility of Cubans and Cuban Americans to call out and correct this 
unfairness.  See Amy Gutmann, Responding to Racial Injustice, in COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL 
MORALITY OF RACE 173 (1996) (Those of us who have unfairly benefited in the past, or will unfairly 
benefit in the future, if we do not act to change things, have special obligations, which flow from the 
general obligation to do our fair share to help others.  We have these special obligations not because we 
asked to be unfairly advantaged but because we have been and are unfairly advantaged.”). 
132 Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 76 Fed. Reg. 5,073 (Jan. 28, 2011).   
133 Id. (“Paragraph (b) of section 515.563 is amended to increase the scope of the statement of 
specific licensing policy for journalistic activities in Cuba to include free-lance journalistic projects 
other than ‘articles.’”). 
134 31 C.F.R. § 515.566(a) (2010). 
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with the journalist example above, this category could be broadened to 
include persons interested in religion and religious subjects in Cuba, but 
not affiliated with a church in the United States.  Under the logic of the 
2000 TSREEA legislation, the category is preserved but widened to allow 
more participating members.   
Also within OFAC discretion is the decision of whether to require only 
general licenses in place of the more odious “specific license.” The specific 
license requires an application review and advance approval of travel by 
OFAC.  By converting all categories currently classified as specific 
licenses into general license categories—permissible under the 2000 
legislation—more people could travel to Cuba with less direct government 
oversight, reducing the administrative burden on the Treasury Department 
as well.135 
The legality of this approach was endorsed by the United States 
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) in a 2009 analysis for members of 
Congress.136  In relevant part, the report explains that the current laws still 
permit the President to authorize travel under the general license for 
travelers currently required to apply for a specific license, including “for 
example, freelance journalists; professional researchers undertaking 
research or professionals attending professional meetings and not 
qualifying for a general license; and enrolled students and full-time 
employees of academic institutions participating in educational 
activities.”137  Further, the GAO explains that the President could increase 
the permissible daily spending limit on travelers visiting family in Cuba.138 
There are ample reasons why the President should open up travel to 
Cuba:  it supports the individual right to travel of U.S. citizens; it rejects 
the ethically questionable and controversial strategy of resource denial to 
advance foreign policy objectives; efforts to isolate Cuba have retarded 
efforts to grow civil society on the island; a majority of Cuban Americans 
now support such repeal; and it is not fair policy to promote in the present 
political context.139 
It is time to try alternatives that resoundingly endorse and enact the 
stated goal of supporting democracy on the island in a post-Cold War 
context.  Travel by Americans with continued economic sanctions 
                                                                                                                          
135 Colvin, supra note 111, at 25 (This second policy choice on the ban is described in detail in a 
policy brief of the New Ideas Fund). 
136 See id. at 29–31 (advocating for Obama to convert all specific licenses to general licenses); 
Gootnick, supra note 96, at 1–17. 
137 Gootnick, supra note 96, at 12.  
138 See id. 
139 For a thoughtful review of different policy reasons to reject the ban, see generally Lifting 
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances to Cuba: A Case for Unilateral Action, CUBA STUDY GRP. 
(Dec. 10, 2008),  http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=4003a70c-1b72-4597-
924b-85967466e520. 
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represents the kind of “conditional engagement” that is best.  The 
engagement that comes in the form of people-to-people contacts represent 
the very best of bilateral relationships to support the growth of a strong 
civil society, and–in the words of one advocacy group–”far outweigh 
whatever financial benefits the Cuban regime may gain from the flow of 
people and resources.”140 
B. Ending Immigration Preferences for Cubans 
The immigration policies of the United States should, for different 
reasons, be normalized. There are strong humanitarian reasons to oppose 
the Wet Foot-Dry Foot policy. A policy that holds out the promise of legal 
residence in the United States if you can arrive on US shores encourages 
individuals to engage in extremely risky behavior by crossing the Florida 
Straits or some other means of “touching ground” in the United States.141  
Moreover, it discourages those at sea from seeking any help from United 
States Coast Guard officials because of the justified fear of persecution and 
punishment resulting from interdiction and return to Cuba.142  
Can this policy be ended without the repeal of the Cuban Adjustment 
Act?  President Johnson enacted the Cuban Adjustment Act in 1966, 
stating that he “chose to enact this policy through the attorney general’s 
authority on immigration matters, rather than seek a bill from a Congress 
that would have likely been fully supportive, keeping control over Cuba 
policy inside the executive branch.”143  In pertinent part, the CAA directs 
that “the status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who has 
been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States. . .may be 
adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such 
regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence.”144  The statute continues by clarifying that 
“[n]othing contained in this Act shall be held to repeal, amend, alter, 
modify, affect or restrict the powers, duties, functions or authority of the 
Attorney General in the administration and enforcement of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act or any other law relating to 
immigration, nationality or naturalization.”145 
The discretion that President Johnson sought to preserve for the 
                                                                                                                          
140 Id. at 10.  
141 WASEM, supra note 14, at 4. A number of immigrants actually go to Mexico and come up 
through Texas to get to the United States with Laredo being the most popular crossing point. Id.  at 10–
11.   
142 Id. at 16. See also Joyce A. Hughes & Alexander L. Alum, Rethinking the Cuban Adjustment 
Act and the U.S National Interest, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 187, 217 (2011) (noting other reasons 
including reduced risk of espionage). 
143 HANEY & VANDERBUSH, supra note 2, at 21. 
144 Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (emphasis added). 
145 Id.  
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executive branch can be read into both sections of the CAA, the first giving 
clear, permissive authority to the immigration service without mandating 
they act. Further, under the current policy of Wet Foot-Dry Foot, the 
decision to parole in the first place remains with the agency, thus 
controlling whether this statute is even implicated for purposes of alien 
adjustment.   
As was shown when it was created by executive fiat in 1994’s balsero 
crisis, the Wet Foot-Dry Foot policy exists at the pleasure of the President.  
Accordingly, the decision of whether or not to continue to perpetuate a 
system of privileged entry to a Cuban immigrant, entry which immigrant 
aspirants from other nations are categorically denied access to—remains 
within the sole discretion of the Executive Branch.146  Indeed, the CAA 
explicitly acknowledges and endorses this discretion.147 The discretion was 
exercised by the Clinton Administration in August 1994 when, by 
executive order, President Clinton began repatriating Cubans in what was 
to become the current policy.  The same discretion can be used today to 
end it totally.   
Sadly, few Cubans and Cuban-Americans who have advocated ending 
the travel ban have spoken up as forcefully on normalizing immigration.  
There are many reasons for this, including that it impacts in a personal way 
all who have family in Cuba.  Nonetheless there is another powerful reason 
for ending this exceptional treatment of Cubans.  It isn’t fair to the millions 
of other would-be immigrants from other nations who, like Cubans, would 
seek a world of economic security and personal liberty like a life in the 
United States would make possible.148   It isn’t fair to give a free pass to 
Cubans for long-extinct Cold War policies, policies which continue to 
seduce like a siren, thousands of Cubans annually to cross the deadly 
Florida Straits. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The dissolution of Communism and the growing irrelevance of Cold 
War rhetoric have combined to weaken policy justifications for the Cuban 
                                                                                                                          
146 For a thorough discussion of the President’s parole powers delegated to him by Congress, see 
Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 501–
505 (2009).  While there are powerful arguments that the President’s discretion would not extend to 
overruling a Congressional prohibition to paroling in a group, here the Congressional intent—as 
expressed through the CAA—is clear at extending the remedial powers of parole to the President. Id. at 
505. 
147 See id. 
148 See, e.g., Alex Stepick, Haitian Boat People: A Study in the Conflicting Forces Shaping U.S. 
Immigration Policy, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 187–88 (1982) (illustrating a powerful example 
of this disparity during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980.  At that time 125,000 Cubans arrived 
contemporaneous with 35,000 Haitians.  The preferences of the CAA and the Cubans eligibility for 
public benefits led to Haitian activists charging discriminatory treatment). 
 30 CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:1 
 
embargo.  Despite this trend, redoubled efforts by anti-Castro Cuban-
Americans and their allies among conservative legislators have prevailed 
into the present in protecting the embargo’s policies to achieve their goal 
of isolating Cuba and ending communism on the island.   
With the weight of foreign policy thought tipping powerfully towards 
diplomatic and humanitarian engagement, the “twin pillars” of anti-Castro 
Cuban-American policy collapse in a puddle of irony:  a single-minded 
focus on Cold War-style isolation—and the ideological orthodoxy and 
political litmus tests that have defended it—has been the very reason for 
failure.    
With straightforward language and a resolve based in sound policy and 
principled fairness, the Obama Administration can and should repeal what 
remains within their discretion to eliminate the travel ban and to limit 
special treatment of Cubans in immigration practice.   
 
